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”Coase vs Hayek”: 
Economic Organization 
 in the Knowledge Economy 
 
Abstract 
Many writers argue that economic organization will be strongly transformed 
in the emerging knowledge economy. Thus, authority relations will wither, or 
at least undergo significant changes; legal and ownership-based definitions of 
the boundaries of firms will become irrelevant; and there will be very few or 
no constraints on the set of feasible combinations of coordination mechanisms, 
as manifested in the increasing proliferation of “new organizational forms.” 
The increased importance of specialist knowledge and the strategic imperative 
of rapidly adjusting to constantly changing contingencies mean that firms lose 
power over employees and that knowledge-based networks that cut across the 
boundaries of firms become as, or more, important as intra-firm relations. The 
present paper critically deals with these claims, beginning from the basic idea 
that they may be analyzed as turning on the implications for the Coasian firm 
of the Hayekian notion that the distributed and subjective character of 
economically relevant knowledge is a strongly binding constraint on the use of 
planned coordination.  Based on organizational economics, it is argued that 
efficiency reasons for the existence of authority under Hayekian distributed 
knowledge may be given; that the increasing importance of knowledge assets 
does not render legal and ownership-based notions of the boundaries of the 
firm irrelevant; and that coordination mechanisms will also cluster in certain, 
predictable combinations in the emerging knowledge economy.   
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I. Introduction 
During the last decade, management academics have strongly stressed the role of 
organizational factors in the process of building knowledge-based strategies that 
will bring sustained competitive advantage (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Grant 
1996; Myers 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Day and Wendler 1998).1  Arguably, 
this emphasis is also reflected in managerial practice.  Thus, firms are argued to 
adopt ”network organization” (Miles and Snow 1992) and engage in ”corporate 
disaggregation” (Zenger and Hesterly 1997), so as to become ”information age 
organizations” (Mendelsson and Pillai 1999) that may build the “dynamic 
capabilities” required for competing in the knowledge economy.  These changes 
with respect to the organization of economic activities take place in tandem with 
changes in the composition of inputs toward knowledge inputs, an increase of the 
“knowledge-content” in outputs, a stepping up of innovative activity, an increasing 
differentiation of demand, increasing globalization, and increasingly inexpensive 
networked computing  changes that are taken to indicate the emergence of the 
“knowledge economy” (Halal and Taylor 1998; Prusak 1998).    
 The present paper is an attempt to address economic organization in context of 
the emerging knowledge economy.  Thus, it asks what are the implications for our 
understanding of issues relating to the scope and organization of alternative 
governance structures of the (presumed) facts that industries are becoming 
increasingly “knowledge-intensive,”2 that an increasing share of the workforce is 
constituted by “knowledge workers,” that commercially useful knowledge becomes 
increasingly distributed and needs to be accessed from several sources, many lying 
outside the boundaries of firms, etc.?  In generic terms, I discuss the implications for 
the Coasian firm of the Hayekian notion that the distributed and subjective 
character of economically relevant knowledge is a strongly binding constraint on 
the use of planned coordination.  Hence, the title of the paper.  
 Admittedly, significant analytical complexity is involved here.  Moreover, any 
discussion of economic organization in the context of the emerging knowledge 
economy is unavoidably somewhat harmed by the lack of robust and clear 
definitions of, as well as a solid empirical knowledge bas about, the “knowledge 
economy.”  However, understanding economic organization in the context of the 
emerging knowledge economy is an important challenge  for three reasons. First, 
it arguably concerns important real tendencies and phenomena with respect to 
economic organization  which so far have only received sporadic attention from 
economists of organization.3  Second, it goes right to the heart of the crucial and 
                                                          
1  However, the pedigree of this goes back a long time, including, for example, Burns and Stalker 
(1961).  
2  For empirical evidence, see Tomlinson (1999).  
3  By the “economics of organization” reference is made to principal-agent theory, incomplete 
contract theory, and transaction cost economics.  Thus, on this definition, proponents of 
resource-based, knowledge-based, capabilities or evolutionary theories of the firm are not 
economists of organization. 
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perennial issues in the theory of economic organization, challenging us to rethink 
issues such as, What are the limits to resource allocation by means of authority?  
What do we mean by authority? What defines the boundaries of firms? How do we 
distinguish an independent contractor from an employee?  These “classic” questions 
are pertinent ones, because it is an underlying theme in much recent work on 
economic organization in the knowledge economy that authority relations, the 
boundaries of firms and the way in which mechanisms for coordinating economic 
activities will undergo significant change under the impact of knowledge that is 
complex, controlled by specialists and distributed in character.  Third, and closely 
related to the previous point, some writers on the knowledge economy (e.g., Boisot 
1998; Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000) argue that existing approaches to the 
economics of organization, such as transaction cost economics, are not capable of 
providing an adequate explanation of economic organization in the knowledge 
economy.  To illustrate: 
… firms are increasingly engaging in collaborations with their suppliers, 
even as they are reducing the extent to which they are vertically integrated 
with those suppliers.  This fact seems incompatible with traditional 
theories of the firm which argue that integration is necessary to avoid the 
potentials for hold-ups created when non-contractible investments are 
made (Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000: 443). 
 The following arguments and positions are developed in the paper.  
Admittedly, it is a justified complaint that post-Coasian organizational economics so 
far has not comprehensively addressed economic organization in the context of the 
knowledge economy.  However, the insights developed in this body of thought are 
actually quite useful for framing the issues.  Moreover, they help to temper  by 
making clear the limits of   more extreme claims about organization in the 
knowledge economy.  Among such claims are that authority relations will strongly 
diminish in importance or at least change significantly in character (Zucker 1991); 
that ownership-based and legal definitions of the boundaries of firms will become 
increasingly irrelevant for understanding the organization of economic activities 
(Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000); and that constraints on the space of feasible 
combinations of coordination mechanisms will be very significantly relaxed (Miles 
et al. 1991). In the following, such claims are all addressed and framed in the context 
of organizational economics, so as to examine their reach.  
  However, this does not mean that organizational economics can survive 
confrontation with the knowledge economy in a completely unchanged form.  On 
the contrary, much work needs to be done with respect to understanding the 
importance of knowledge assets (cf. also Holmström and Roberts 1998), distributed 
knowledge (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss 1999), and environmental complexity 
(Athey et al. 1994) for organizational design.4  Still, however, many of the basic 
insights and ideas survive and are very useful for the understanding of economic 
                                                          
4  It is also true that organizational economics needs to develop a better understanding of  
external and (particularly) internal hybrids (Zenger 1997; Foss 2000a).  
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organization in a knowledge economy, including new organizational forms.5   Thus, 
the basic aim of this paper is not theory building per se.   It is rather to engage in a 
dialogue with those management academics who have written on organization in 
the emerging knowledge economy, and in this context to examine the reach of 
organizational economics. 
II. Economic Organization in the Knowledge Economy: 
Preliminary 
In this section, some recent claims about how the advent of the knowledge economy 
will change economic organization are reviewed. In order to focus the discussion, 
six “interpretive propositions” are identified.  These are intended to summarize 
influential, recent ideas on 1) the changing role of knowledge in production, 2) 
economic organization in the knowledge economy, and 3) how 1) and 2) are 
connected.  
Some Recent Claims about Economic Organization in a Knowledge Economy 
 Many disciplines, fields and sub-fields are involved in the ongoing discussion 
of efficient organization in the context of the emerging knowledge economy.  
Nevertheless, a number of distinct themes are discernible in much of the debate. 
Overall, a consensus seems to be emerging that tasks and activities in the 
knowledge economy need to be coordinated in a manner that is very different from 
the management of traditional manufacturing activities, with profound 
transforming implications for the authority relation and the internal organization 
and boundaries of firms.  There are several reasons for this.   
 Because of the increasing importance in knowledge-intensive industries of 
combining knowledge inputs, sourcing knowledge for this purpose, and keeping 
sourcing options open, knowledge-based networks (Harryson 2000) increasingly 
become the relevant dimension for understanding the organization of economic 
activities.  Such networks typically cut across the legal boundaries of the firm, for 
example, in the sense that inter-firm communication channels may have much 
greater bandwidth than intra-firm channels or that inter-firm coordination 
requirements are more severe between firms than within firms.6 Networks are 
                                                          
5  The paper thus provides a partial response to Daft and Lewin’s (1993) question, “Where are the 
theories of the ‘new organizational forms’?”. 
6  From such a position, the legal boundaries of the firm will only coincide with the boundaries of 
knowledge-based networks if considerations of appropriability, imposing a strong need for 
protecting knowledge, completely dominate considerations of sourcing knowledge from 
networks.  More likely, however, the boundaries between markets and firms are fading into 
insignificance as generalized reciprocal knowledge exchange in communities of practice and 
other network forms, as well as hyper-competitive conditions, make knowledge protection 
issues less relevant: What will matter for long-run competitive advantage will not be the extent 
to which, for example, technical capabilities can be protected from imitation, but the dynamic 
capability to continuously source, integrate and recombine diverse knowledge inputs (D’Aveni 
1994; Grant 1996).   
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particularly useful organizational arrangements for sourcing and transferring 
knowledge because of the costs of pricing knowledge (in a market) or transferring it 
(in a hierarchy) (Powell 1990: 304; Liebeskind et al. 1995: 7).  The increased reliance 
on knowledge networks tends to erode authority-based definitions of the 
boundaries of the firm, because authority increasingly shifts to expert individuals 
who control crucial information resources and may not be employees of the firm. As 
Zucker (1991: 164) argues: 
While bureaucratic authority is by definition located within the firm’s 
boundaries, expert authority depends on the information resources 
available to an individual, and not on the authority of office.  Thus, 
authority may be located within the organization … but when an external 
authority market can provide information that leads to greater 
effectiveness, then authority tends to migrate into the market. 
To the extent that important knowledge assets are increasingly controlled by 
employees (“knowledge workers”) themselves, traditional authority relations are 
fading into insignificance.  This is partly a result of the increased bargaining power 
on the part of knowledge workers (stemming from the control over critical 
knowledge assets) (Coff 1999), and partly a result of the increasingly specialist 
nature of knowledge work (Hodgson 1998a).  The specialist nature of knowledge 
work implies that principals/employers become ignorant about (some of) the 
actions that are open to specialist agents/employees, thus making the exercise of 
authority through direction increasingly inefficient. The combined effect of the 
increased importance of knowledge assets that are controlled by knowledge 
workers themselves and of the increasingly specialist nature of knowledge work is 
to wreck the traditional economist’s criterion of what distinguishes market 
transactions from hierarchical transactions (Zingales 2000). Thus, whether direction 
by means of order giving (Coase 1937; Simon 1951; Williamson 1985; Demsetz 1991) 
and backed up by the ownership of alienable assets (Hart and Moore 1990) obtains 
or not is increasingly irrelevant for understanding the organization of economic 
activities in a knowledge economy (Grandori 2000).  
 Not only does the emerging knowledge economy profoundly change the 
authority relation, and the boundaries of firms; it also influences the design of firms’ 
internal organization, that is, their allocation of decision rights.  As Miles et al. (1997: 
7) argue:  
Each major era in business history has featured a particular form of 
organization. Early hierarchical, vertically integrated organizations have 
largely given way to network organizations that link the assets and know-
how of numerous upstream and downstream industry partners. A number 
of leading companies today are experimenting with a new way of 
organizing – the cellular form.  Cellular organizations are built on the 
principles of entrepreneurship, self-organization, and member ownership.  
In the future, cellular organizations will be used in situations requiring 
continuous learning and innovation. 
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By suggesting that radical internal hybrids, “built on the principles of 
entrepreneurship, self-organization, and member ownership,” are emerging as 
stable organizational modes, this quotation (and others like it) suggests that 
mechanisms for coordinating economic activities are more combinable, and that the 
set of stable discrete governance structures is larger, than what is conventionally 
assumed in much of organization theory and in the economics of organization (e.g., 
Coase 1937; Williamson 1996).7  These new governance structures are increasingly 
often referred to as “new organizational forms” (Daft and Lewin 1993; Zenger and 
Hesterly 1997).  To the extent that new organizational forms represent new ways of 
combining mechanisms that have traditionally been seen as characteristic of 
governance structures that are polar opposites, they also exemplify the fading 
boundaries between markets and firms (Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000).  
What Are We Talking About? Six Interpretive Propositions 
 In order to meaningfully discuss economic organization in a knowledge 
economy, there is a need for some conceptual clarification and some focusing of the 
issues.  Most fundamentally, it is necessary to define the aspects of the knowledge 
economy that are most obviously relevant for an understanding of economic 
organization. Existing treatments emphasize such dimensions as increased 
knowledge content of outputs and the composition of inputs, hyper-competition 
and therefore the paramount importance of learning, decreasing corporate size, the 
importance of IT innovations, increasing differentiation of demand, increased 
general environmental complexity, increasing importance of networks for the 
transfer and production of knowledge, etc. (e.g., D’Aveni 1994; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995; Grant 1996; Miles et al. 1997; Boisot 1998; Matusik and Hill 1998; 
Leadbetter 1999; Coombs and Metcalfe 2000; Zingales 2000).   
 Needless to say, dealing with all of this as it impacts on economic organization 
is a task of forbidding complexity.  A narrowing of the issues is required.  In order 
to do so, I submit that for the purposes of understanding economic organization, recent 
claims about the impact of the knowledge economy on organization may usefully be 
narrowed down to two basic propositions about knowledge in production and four 
basic propositions about economic organization.8   The first set of assertions both 
turn on the increased importance of specialist knowledge:   
Proposition 1: Because of the increased need for diverse, specialized 
knowledge in production, commercially relevant knowledge is becoming 
increasingly distributed in the Hayekian sense (e.g., Coombs and Metcalfe 
2000). 9      
                                                          
7  See Grandori (2000) for a sophisticated argument that because both organization theory and 
organizational economics have put too much of an emphasis on discrete, stable, “consistent” 
governance structures, and too little on more micro-analytic coordination mechanisms (e.g., 
price, norms, authority, teams, etc.), the number of ways in which such mechanisms may be 
combined has been strongly under-estimated. 
8  The possible risk of constructing a strawman is admitted, and discussed in the Conclusion. 
9  “Distributed knowledge” is knowledge that is not possessed by any single mind and which 
may be private and tacit, but which it may nevertheless be necessary to somehow mobilize for 
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Proposition 2: Because of the increased importance of sourcing specialist 
knowledge, knowledge assets controlled by individual agents 
(“knowledge workers”) are becoming increasingly important in 
production (e.g., Boisot 1998). 
For convenience, settings in which Propositions 1 and 2 hold true are characterized 
as “Hayekian.”  Further narrowing of the issues is produced by the three following 
(related) propositions about economic organization in a knowledge economy  all 
of which may be found in recent writings: 
Proposition 3: In the emerging knowledge economy, authority relations 
will become increasingly inefficient and insignificant means of allocating 
resources (e.g., Semler 1989; Hodgson 1998a). 
Proposition 4: The boundaries of firms blur because of the increasing 
importance of knowledge networks that transcend those boundaries.  
Thus, while legal and ownership-based definitions of the boundaries of the 
firm may formally be made, they will be increasingly irrelevant from an 
economic (and strategic) perspective (e.g., Zucker 1991; Helper, MacDuffie 
and Sabel 2000). 
Proposition 5:  Coordination mechanisms will be combined in new, 
innovative ways, suggesting that these mechanisms are inherently 
combinable and not limited to being necessarily clustered in certain 
discrete governance structures (e.g., Grandori 1997; Helper, MacDuffie and 
Sabel 2000).10 
Although these propositions are rather open-ended, they are open to theoretical 
treatment (and in principle to empirical test as well).  Moreover, so is the final 
proposition: 
Proposition 6: The effects described in Propositions 3 to 5 are driven by 
changes in the way in which knowledge enters into the productive process, 
as described in Propositions 1 to 2.   
The strategy that I follow in the ensuing pages is that of critically discussing 
Proposition 3 to 6, taking Propositions 1 and 2 as given (i.e., accepted).  In other 
words, I discuss the typically Coasian themes of authority, the boundaries of the 
firm, and the combinability of coordination mechanisms in the context of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
the carrying out of a productive task (Hayek 1945). Many writers have argued that such 
distributed knowledge is of increasing importance in an innovation-rich, knowledge-based 
economy (e.g., Ghoshal, Moran and Almeida-Costa 1995; Hodgson 1998a; Coombs and Metcalfe 
2000).  Grant (1996: 378) argues that Hayekian distributed knowledge is crucial to the 
understanding of organizational capabilities: “Although higher-level capabilities involve the 
integration of lower-level capabilities, such integration can only be achieved through 
integrating individual knowledge.  This is precisely why higher-level capabilities are so difficult 
to perform.”  
10  By “coordination mechanisms” reference is made to a wide set of mechanisms for allocating 
resources, such as authority, norms, teams, prices, contracts, voting, etc.  For an innovative 
overview, see Grandori (2001).  
 7
typically Hayekian setting in which knowledge is distributed and subjectively held 
(see Figure 1). 
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 XXXXXXXX 
The strategy is to discuss the role (if any) of authority in Hayekian settings, examine 
the connections between authority and ownership, and finally discuss how 
authority and ownership constrain the malleability and combinability of 
coordination mechanisms.    Thus, as will become clear, the themes of authority, 
ownership, and the malleability of coordination mechanisms are strongly connected.   
These themes are addressed seriatim in the following. 
III. Authority in the Economics of Organization 
The following is a discussion of the notion of authority as it appears in a few, crucial 
organizational economics contributions.  The reason for focusing on what 
economists of organization have said about authority is that these scholars offer 
clear and stark interpretations of authority and that this paper is based on 
organizational economics.  This is not to deny that much insight may be gained from 
the more encompassing classic discussions of Weber (1946, 1947), Barnard (1938), 
etc., and that economists of organization should pay more attention to these (cf. 
Aghion and Tirole 1997).  However, at the present stage a more narrow and focused 
approach is appropriate, particular as the above propositions primarily relate to the 
relatively narrow notions of authority typically found in the works of organizational 
economist..   
Coase, Simon and Wernerfelt 
 It is conventional to date the birth of organizational economics to Ronald 
Coase’s 1937 paper, “The Nature of the Firm.”  This is justified by Coase’s stress on 
market failure caused by transaction costs as the starting point for any explanation 
of firms, and by his contractual approach, comparative institutionalism, and clear 
identification of the main explanatory requirements of a theory of the firm (i.e., 
explaining the existence, boundaries, and internal organization of firms).11 Coase 
also founded the widespread practice of identifying the firm with the employment 
contract; indeed, he puts much emphasis on the flexibility afforded by incomplete 
employment contracts and the authority relation as the ultimate reason for the 
existence of firms.12 Thus, as Langlois and Foss (1999) have argued Coase’s 
                                                          
11  In other respects, however, Coase is not so obvious a precursor.  For example, the emphasis in 
the modern economics of organization on incentive conflicts, including the hold-up problem 
(Williamson 1985; Hart 1995), as a main explanatory principle cannot be found in Coase’s 
paper, as he has stressed himself (Coase 1988). 
12  “It may be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service,” Coase 
writes. “Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of the contract is for 
the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for 
the person purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well 
be a matter of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity which of several 
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explanation for the emergence of the firm is ultimately a coordination one: The firm 
is an institution that lowers the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of 
uncertainty.13  The employment contract is explained in related terms, as “… one 
whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating) 
agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits.  The essence of 
the power is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur.  
Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production” (idem.: 
242).14   
 A later paper by Herbert Simon (1951) provided a formalization of Coase’s 
notion of the employment relationship and a clarification of the notion of authority.  
The latter is defined as obtaining when a “boss” is permitted by a “worker” to select 
actions, A0 ⊂ A, where A is the set of the worker’s possible behaviors.  More or less 
authority is then simply defined as making the set A0 larger or smaller. The model is 
basically a multi-stages game in the context of an incomplete contract with ex post 
governance: In the first period, the prospective worker decides whether to accept 
employment or not.  Then nature intervenes, uncertainty is resolved, and the costs 
and benefits associated with the various possible tasks are revealed.  Finally, the 
boss directs the worker to a task (see Figure 2). 
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 2 here XXXXXXXX 
To the extent that the boss cares about his reputation, he will not direct the worker 
to undertake tasks that lie outside the latter’s “zone of acceptance,” and there may 
thus be an equilibrium in the three-stages game.  
 A problem with Simon’s paper is that he does not really address the issues in 
the manner of comparative contracting.  Thus, the worker only has the choice of 
accepting or not accepting to work for the boss; the parties are not seen as choosing 
between an employment relation and alternative contractual arrangements for 
regulating a relation.  In a recent contribution, Wernerfelt (1997) begins from 
Coasian and Simonian premises.  By portraying governance mechanisms as 
gameforms (spot contracting, price lists, hierarchy) chosen to regulate trade 
Wernerfelt makes precise Coase’s idea that the choice of a governance mechanism is 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that commodity or service. But the 
purchaser will not know which of these several courses he will want the supplier to take.  
Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact details 
being left until a later date. ... The details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in 
the contract but is decided later by the purchaser.  When the direction of resources (within the 
limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I 
term a “firm” may be obtained (Coase 1937: 242-243). 
13  Apparently, some organization scholars disagree with this.  Thus, Grandori (1997: 37) notes that 
it has been “well-documented” in organization studies that “… authority is not very effective in 
managing uncertainty.”  It will later be argued that this depends much on the context; for 
example, if strong interdependencies (“complementarities”) between activities are involved, 
authority may be extremely effective for “managing uncertainty.”   
14  See Hodgson (1998b) for an interesting critical discussion of Coase’s notions of authority and 
the employment contract.  
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partly determined by the flexibility afforded by that mechanism and he extends 
Simon’s analysis by explicitly comparing alternative mechanisms.  Specifically, 
gameforms determine how players adapt to changes in the environment and 
communicate about these changes. Wernerfelt’s conjecture is that these different 
gameforms will be systematically characterized by different levels of costs of 
making adaptations. For example, in the case of the hierarchy, the employer and the 
employee avoid the costs of negotiating either a very complex agreement or a series 
of short-term contracts.  Instead, the parties negotiate a once-and-for-all wage 
contract.  In this context, authority is simply an implicit contract which states that 
one of the parties should have the authority to tell the other what to do (as in Coase 
1937).  This game-form requires less bargaining over prices than the market game-
form, and is selected to save to on communication (adaptation) costs.  The 
agreement to play by the least costly adaptation-mechanism is upheld by the 
parties’ concern for reputation in a repeated game.15   
 To sum up, in the Coase-Simon-Wernerfelt (henceforth, “CSW”) view of 
authority, the action space is well-defined and known both to the “boss” and the 
“worker,” the boss observes those states of nature to which it is necessary to react 
(e.g., a realization of demand on the firm’s product markets), he possesses the right 
to direct the worker, and the worker obeys the boss’ instructions “within limits.”  
The Puzzling Notion of Authority 
 The CSW view of authority raises several puzzles.   In the present context, four 
such puzzles are particularly relevant: 
1. What is ultimately the source of the employer’s authority? In other words, why 
exactly is it that the employee accepts to be directed?  These are pertinent 
questions given that slavery is prohibited (i.e., human assets are inalienable).  
2. What happens to CSW view if the employer does not possess full knowledge of 
the employee’s action set (i.e., the actions that he can take when uncertainty is 
resolved), so that the employee can take actions about which the employer has 
no knowledge? (In other words, the employer suffers from “sheer ignorance” in 
the sense of Kirzner 1997). 
3. What happens to the CSW view of authority if the employee is better informed 
than the employer with respect to how certain tasks should (optimally) be 
carried out?  In the CSW view there is an implicit assumption that the employer 
is at least as well informed, and presumably better, about the efficiency 
implications of alternative actions.16 
                                                          
15  Williamson’s (1975, 1985, 1996) work adds to these notions of authority by stressing that 
different bodies of law apply to different kinds of transactions, the implicit contract law of 
internal governance being that of forebearance.  See Masten (1991) and Vandenberghe and 
Siegers (2000) for illuminating discussions of these issues.  Wang and Zhu (2000) formalize 
Williamson’s idea. 
16  This is explicitly argued in Demsetz (1988) and Conner and Prahalad (1996). 
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4. What happens to the CSW view if employees control knowledge assets that they 
cannot, or will not, alienate (sell, transfer), and which may give them substantial 
bargaining power so that they cannot automatically be assumed to obey 
instructions?  
The last three questions relate to the issue of the limits of authority in Hayekian 
settings, while the first question asks about the sources of the employer’s bargaining 
power over the employee.17  Only the first question has been given extensive 
treatment in the economics of organization.  In fact, it has been one of the classic 
points of contention in a long-standing debate in economics, one that was initiated 
by Alchian and Demsetz (1972).  They argue that it is not meaningful to assume that 
an employer can force an employee to do what the employer wants in the absence of 
coercion.18 An implication of this view is that the distinction between the authority-
based and the price-based modes of allocation emphasized by Coase (1937) is 
superficial. One may perhaps talk about a nexus of contracts being more “firm-like” 
when continuity of association among input owners increases and/or residual 
claimancy becomes more concentrated, but it is not in general useful to talk about 
“firms” as distinctive entities. In reality, they argue, there is no economic difference 
between “firing” one’s grocer and firing one’s secretary.19  
Authority and Ownership  
 One response to the nexus of contracts view is that there are in fact 
fundamental economic differences between firms and markets, because the law 
makes an explicit distinction between market transactions and employment 
transactions  a distinction that makes the incentives faced by the parties to the 
relevant transactions differ (Masten 1991), and provides an economic role for 
authority (Vandenberghe and Siegers 2000).  However, the work of Oliver Hart and 
others (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995, 1996; Hart and Moore 1990) — called 
the incomplete-contracts literature — provides an approach to the understanding of 
authority that is not dependent on legal considerations of this kind.  In one 
important respect this approach differs from all earlier treatments of authority: 
Whereas Weber, Coase, Barnard, Simon, etc. focus on direct authority over (non-
alienable) human assets, the incomplete contracts literature rather explain authority 
over human assets as something that is indirectly acquired through authority 
(ownership) over alienable assets.  Since use will be made of this kind of reasoning 
later, it is worth briefly examining it. 
 Contributors to the incomplete contract literature distinguish two basic types 
of decision rights (“property rights”): specific rights and residual rights.  The latter 
are generic rights to make decisions in circumstances not spelled out in the contract, 
and imply the ability to exclude other agents from deciding on the use of certain 
                                                          
17  However, as will become apparent later, the four questions are closely related. 
18  Relatedly, Barnard (1938) argued that for authority to be effective, it has to be accepted.  
19  Note that this “nexus of contracts” position is remarkably close to the position that in a 
knowledge-based economy, the firm/market boundary is unclear and the notion of authority 
elusive at best, although its conceptual basis is rather different. 
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assets. Residual control rights are conferred by legal ownership.20 In contrast, 
specific rights are allocated through contract terms.  If contracts were complete, all 
rights would be specific, and there would be no residual rights.  Two kinds of assets 
are distinguished, namely alienable (i.e., non-human) and non-alienable (i.e., 
human) assets.  Given this, the distinction between an independent contractor and 
an employee (i.e., between an inter-firm and an intra-firm transaction) now turns on 
who owns the non-alienable assets that an agent (whether independent or 
employee) utilizes in his work. An independent contractor owns his tools etc., while 
an employee does not.  The importance of asset ownership derives from the fact that 
the willingness of an agent to undertake a non-contractible investment (say, exertion 
of effort or investment in human capital), which is specific to the asset, depends on 
who owns the asset.   
 As in Alchian and Demsetz, the parties to a relation  whether customer and 
grocer, or employer and employee  are seen as being in a bargaining situation, 
each having an outside option.  Although the parties in the specific models that are 
analyzed always reach an efficient agreement, the division of the surplus from the 
relation will nevertheless depend on who owns the alienable assets in the relation, 
since the pattern of ownership will influence the parties’ outside options.  For 
example, if the employer owns all the alienable assets, the employee can still quit if 
he dislikes the employer’s orders (as in Alchian and Demsetz), but he cannot take 
the assets with him, and the employer can ensure that if the employee leaves, 
somebody else can take over the job.   Thus, as Hart (1996: 379) explains, “… an 
employer’s authority is represented not by the ability to force an employee to do 
what s/he wants, but rather by the ability to obtain a substantial share of the ex post 
surplus from the relationship through the control of non-human assets.”  Efficiency 
considerations then suggest that authority (i.e., ownership to the alienable assets) 
should be allocated to the agent who makes the most important (non-contractible) 
relation-specific investment.  Thus, in an elegant manner, Hart (and his colleagues) 
link together the issues of the boundaries of the firm (which are defined in terms of 
ownership of alienable assets) and authority.21  However, this only provides an 
answer to the first of the four puzzles above.   The remaining three are discussed in 
the next section.   
   
                                                          
20  For a critique of these aspects of the incomplete contract literature, see Foss and Foss (2001). 
21  Although the property rights approach of Hart and Moore succeeds in adding an important 
component to the understanding of authority, and provides a strong answer to the Alchian and 
Demsetz denial of authority being a useful concept, arguably it doesn’t succeed in giving a full 
explanation of the employment contract, or the firm.  For example, the bargaining power 
possessed by a principal who owns the complementary physical assets in a relation may be 
exercised over an employee or it may be exercised over a legally independent party who just 
happens to have given up ownership of alienable assets to strenghen incentives (i.e., vertical 
quasi-integration) (Foss and Foss 2001).  In other words, there is no one-to-one correspondence 
between the firm and the Hart understanding of the exercise of authority.  In fact, as Bengt 
Holmström (1999: 87) has recently argued, the incomplete contracts literature “… is a theory 
about asset ownership by individuals rather than by firms.” 
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IV. Authority: The Challenge of the Knowledge Economy 
So far, the debate in organizational economics has almost exclusively centered on 
the problem of providing explanations of what it is that makes the employer able to 
direct the employee and whether this differs fundamentally from market exchange.  
In contrast, the knowledge-related puzzles, made increasingly relevant by the 
emergence of the knowledge economy, have not been given much attention. The 
problem of what happens to the CSW notion of authority when agents are better 
informed than principals about how certain tasks should be carried out, the 
principal is ignorant about certain actions that the agent may take, or agents have 
considerable bargaining power because of their control over knowledge assets, is 
not necessarily one of “asymmetric information,” as this is understood in 
information economics. In a typical asymmetric information problem, an 
uninformed agent knows what he is uninformed about (e.g., the precise quality of a 
car).  However, this excludes ignorance and how ignorance may be overcome 
through processes of discovery (Kirzner 1997; Foss 1999; Sautet 2000).  A possible 
interpretation of the claim that authority relations will be transformed, and perhaps 
vanish, in the emerging knowledge economy is that these relations will break down 
under the impact of principals becoming increasingly uninformed about the actions 
open to agents and at the same time becoming increasingly reliant on the knowledge 
controlled by agents.  These are the characteristics of Hayekian settings.  
Hayek on Distributed Knowledge 
 Arguably, Hayek was the first to frame the issue of how to make best use of 
distributed knowledge (1945: 77-78; see also Hayek 1937, 1946, 1968).  As he 
explained:  
The economic problem of society is … not merely a problem of how to 
allocate “given” resources − if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind 
which deliberately solves the problem set by these “data”.  It is rather a 
problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the 
members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these 
individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of 
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.  
The dating of the Hayek paper reveals that the problem of making optimal use of 
distributed knowledge is not a novel one, only brought about by the emergence of 
the knowledge economy; in fact, any complex social system confronts it (Hayek 
1964). Arguably, however, the problems posed by Hayekian distributed knowledge 
have become increasingly pressing for firms (cf. Cowen and Parker 1997; Sautet 
2000). Thus, because of the increased importance of specialist workers and the 
increased knowledge-intensity of production, coping with the problem posed by 
Hayekian distributed knowledge has moved from being a problem for socialist 
managers and dirigiste bureaucrats to also being a problem confronted by managers 
of (at least large) firms in capitalist economies.  In fact, many of those who argue 
that organization in the knowledge economy will differ significantly from previous 
mode of organizing explain this by something like the Hayekian perspective on 
 13
distributed knowledge, either explicitly or implicitly (e.g., Hodgson 1998a).22  Thus, 
like Hayek they are implicitly making the claim that dispersed knowledge poses an 
organizational problem because it is prohibitively costly to centralize all relevant 
knowledge.23  
 Hayek’s well-known point is that a market system (but not a socialist one) 
promotes a tendency towards allocating property rights to those who can make best 
use of them.  More precisely, a system with alienable property rights solves 
simultaneously both the assignment and the moral hazard problem.  However, 
firms are different in that they don’t solve these problems spontaneously.  This is 
not only a matter of the moral hazard problem of making optimal use of decision 
rights being more severe in firms than in markets (Jensen and Meckling 1992).  It is 
also a matter of firms not being able to rely (to the same extent) on the market’s 
ability to spontaneously allocate resources towards highest-valued ends.  Thus, 
within firms resources are directed (to a larger extent than in markets), and 
motivation of employees is engineered (to larger extent than in markets).  From a 
Hayekian perspective, firms would seem to be inherently disadvantaged relative to 
markets, for firms encounter a fundamental problem that markets do not, namely 
… the problem which any attempt to bring order into complex human 
activities meets: the organizer must wish the individuals who are to 
cooperate to make use of knowledge that he himself does not possess” 
(Hayek 1973: 49) 
The fact that firms do exist is prima facie evidence that they can somehow cope with 
the problem and/or that there are offsetting benefits of firm organization.24  
Distributed Knowledge, Delegated Rights, and Authority  
 How may the Hayekian knowledge-problem be handled in firms? One 
obvious way is to suppress distributed knowledge as far as possible by discouraging 
local initiative, indoctrinating employees harshly, and operating with rigid routines 
and operating procedures.25 The archetypal “machine bureaucracy” fits this overall 
                                                          
22  Clearly, there are other reasons why economic organization may differ in the emerging 
knowledge economy.  For example, to the extent that innovative activity strongly increase in the 
knowledge economy (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Coombs and Metcalfe 2000) and to the extent 
that the production of new knowledge requires intrinsic motivation rather than extrinsic 
motivation (Osterloh and Frey 2000; Osterloh and Frost 2000), this may require changes in the 
distribution of decision rights and reward schemes in organizations.  Such changes don’t turn 
on the Hayekian problem of distributed knowledge per se. 
23  Hayek (1945) is reprinted in Myers’ (1996) collection of classics in knowledge management. 
24  Such as the superior ability of firms to organize transactions characterized by high-levels of 
relation-specific investments (Williamson 1985, 1996; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 
1990).  
25  Marglin (1974) tells such a story of the emergence of capitalist authority (although one whose 
Marxian pedigree makes it strongly differ from the Hayekian emphasis on dispersed 
knowledge): A thoroughgoing de-skilling of labor was required before capitalist relations could 
thriumph. 
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characterization.26 However, to the extent that competition is increasingly 
knowledge-based, this is a self-defeating strategy. According to a hugely influential 
perspective, successful organizational learning (which fosters new products, 
processes and organization) is a matter of balancing processes of exploiting existing 
resources with processes of exploring new ways of combining, acquiring, building, 
etc. resources (March 1991). Suppressing distributed knowledge is tantamount to 
suppressing exploration; thus, firms must devise ways to cope with Hayekian 
distributed knowledge.   However, coping with distributed knowledge inevitably 
seems to lead in the direction of decentralization, as Hayek (1945: 83-84) forcefully 
argued: 
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid 
adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it 
would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people 
who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant 
changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot 
expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this 
knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues 
its orders. 
Coping with distributed knowledge would thus seem to require extensive 
delegation of rights. In fact, there is an argument that under Hayekian distributed 
knowledge, de facto delegation of rights already obtains.  Thus, the formal right to 
decide need not confer effective control over decisions, as Aghion and Tirole (1997) 
point out with a bow to Max Weber.  Thus, real authority is already largely 
determined by the structure of information in the organization, including the 
distribution of Hayekian dispersed knowledge.   Of course, agents who possess 
local knowledge may be subject to the exercise of authority by uninformed 
hierarchical superiors, but this is likely to harm incentives.27 Thus, in Aghion and 
Tirole (1997), an increase in the agent’s real authority is assumed to lead to control 
losses from the point of view of the principal but also to promote initiative; efficient 
organization strikes value-maximizing trade-off.  It is apparent that Hayekian 
distributed knowledge has important for understanding internal organization, such 
as the adoption of internal hybrids in the form of project- or team-based 
organization, “molecular forms,” “cellular organizations,” etc.28  
                                                          
26  By emphasizing knowledge transfer in firms, knowledge management techniques may also be 
said to reduce the distributed character of knowledge in firms. 
27  Here is a further limitation to the use of authority.  As Frey (1997) argues, both the use of 
incentive instruments and authoritative direction may harm intrinsic motivation.  Osterloh and 
Frey (2000) and Osterloh and Frost (2000) explore some of the organizational implications of 
this.  For an earlier treatment from a sociological position, see Baron (1988). 
28  The basic conclusion in such a perspective is that decision rights should be delegated in such a 
way that the benefits of delegation in terms of better utilizing local knowledge are balanced 
against the costs of delegation in terms of agency losses (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Jensen and 
Wruck 1994; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss and Foss 2000).  An interpretation of much of the 
contemporary emphasis on internal hybrids, such as team-organization, “molecular forms”, and 
other manifestations of organizational delegation and decentralization, is that these are 
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 However, while a Hayekian perspective is informative for understanding 
internal hybrids, it does not answer the puzzle why such hybrids are at all 
organized inside firms.  Because they are organized inside firms, they are subject to 
the exercise of, at least formal, authority.  Being overruled by formal hierarchical 
superiors may harm motivation.  Thus, moving teams out of firms would seem to 
yield net benefits, since incentives would be strengthened.29  In fact, spin-offs, carve-
outs, and the like may be explained in these terms, so we should ask why not all 
internal hybrids are spun-off.  Adding to the puzzle is that authority in the sense of 
Coase, Simon and Wernerfelt appears to play at best a very limited role under 
Hayekian dispersed knowledge.  This is because the Coase/Simon notion of 
authority assumes that a directing principal is at least as knowledgeable about the 
relevant tasks as the agent being directed. 
 The ownership-based notion of authority developed by Hart also seems to 
play only a limited role under Hayekian distributed knowledge.  There are several 
reasons for this.  First, in Hart’s framework all residual decision-making power is 
concentrated in the hands of the owner/manager, whereas in actuality delegation 
often amounts to delegating at least some residual decision rights to hierarchical 
subordinates (e.g., division managers).  Implicitly, the notion that, on the one hand, 
there are rights that may be clearly specified in a contract and allocated to another 
party, and that, on the other hand, there are rights that cannot at all be specified in a 
contract but can only be allocated to a single party through asset ownership, means 
that the only room left for delegation is that agents receive well-specified rights to 
carry out well-specified actions.  However, this implies that if agents can take 
actions about which principals have no knowledge or are better informed about 
how certain actions should be carried out, the superior knowledge of agents cannot 
be utilized.   
 A second reason why Hartian ownership-based authority may be increasingly 
irrelevant under Hayekian distributed knowledge is that the assets that in Hart’s 
scheme confer authority are physical assets (Hart 1995).  However, as many writers 
have emphasized an important aspect of the knowledge economy is exactly that 
physical assets are of strongly waning importance (Myers 1996; Boisot 1998; Neef 
1998).  Of course, the implication is that ownership over such assets is an 
increasingly ineffective source of bargaining power and that, therefore, authority 
must wane as bargaining power increasingly becomes more symmetrically 
distributed over the owners of knowledge assets.   
Authority  and Authority  
 The reasoning so far seems to lead to an acceptance of Proposition 3  (i.e., “In 
the emerging knowledge economy, authority relations will become increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
prompted by a pressure to delegate decision rights and structure reward schemes in such a way 
that optimal trade-offs are reached (Zenger 1997; Zenger and Hesterly 1997). 
29  In fact, some writers draw what appears to be the logical consequence of a Hayekian starting 
point, and flatly argue that only firms that explicitly emulate market organization to the largest 
possible extent can survive and prosper in the knowledge economy (Cowen and Parker 1997). 
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inefficient and insignificant means of allocating resources”). Authority  in the 
sense of economists of organization such as Coase, Simon, Wernerfelt and Hart  is 
stretched beyond its limits by the increasing importance of Hayekian settings.  
Grandori (1997: 35) points out the limits of the CSW view of authority:   
… whatever its basis, authority is a feasible governance mechanism only if 
information and competence relevant to solving economic action problems 
can be transferred to and handled by a single actor, a positive “zone of 
acceptance” exists, the actions of other supervised actors are observable, 
and if the system is not as large as to incur an overwhelming 
communication channel overload and control losses. 
Of course, whether all these conditions obtain is an empirical question.  What many 
proponents of the argument that the knowledge economy will radically transform 
economic organization implicitly assert is that these conditions are increasingly less 
likely to hold.  
 However, a main problem with the argument that authority will become 
increasingly inefficient and therefore increasingly less prevalent as a coordination 
mechanism (i.e., Proposition 3) is that it implicitly accepts a narrow interpretation of 
what authority is, namely the CSW view.  The same is true of the Grandori 
quotation above. The CSW view is narrow, because, for example, it explicitly 
implies that the boss performs a detailed direction of the worker’s actions, based on 
a complete knowledge of the worker’s action set, and because it implicitly asserts 
that the boss is always at least as, or more, knowledgeable about what actions 
should optimally be carried out.  However, these conditions are not strictly 
necessary for authority in the broader sense of directing somebody to do something, 
for example, backed on some superior bargaining power.  
 For example, in many firms decision rights are allocated by the top-
management team and the board of directors to lower levels, presumably in order to 
better cope with the distributed knowledge (Jensen and Meckling 1992). However, 
typically these rights are circumscribed.  For example, the right to use an asset in 
certain ways may be delegated; however, it is understood that that right does not 
entail the right to use the asset in the service of a competitor firm.   Thus, decision 
rights are delegated in firms, but they are delegated as means to an end (Hayek 
1973); their use is monitored (Jensen and Meckling 1992), and top-management 
reserves ultimate decision rights for itself (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2000).   This 
suggests that authority in the sense of direction and centralized decision-making  
which does not necessarily require detailed knowledge about a subordinate’s 
knowledge or available actions  may persist in Hayekian settings.  The following 
section discusses this in greater detail. 
V. Authority in Hayekian Settings 
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Authority in the Presence of Hidden Knowledge 
 This section examines the role of authority, understood in the broad sense of 
direction, in a Hayekian setting of distributed knowledge.  Distributed knowledge is 
here approximated by “hidden knowledge” (Minkler 1993) in principal-agent 
relations.  That is, it will be assumed that the problem facing an principal is not just 
that she is uninformed about what state of nature has been revealed or of the 
realization of the agent’s effort (i.e., hidden information), as in the standard agency 
paradigm.  Rather, the agent’s knowledge is superior to that of the principal with 
respect to certain production possibilities (i.e., hidden knowledge).  The principal 
may be ignorant about some members of the set of possible actions open to the 
agent, or the agent may be better informed than the employer with respect to how 
certain tasks should (optimally) be carried out, or both.  The setting is one of 
incomplete contracts, so authority refers to the giving of direction in situations 
about which contracts are silent.  Given this, the issue is whether it is possible, 
under hidden knowledge, to make sense of authority in the sense of direction on 
grounds of efficiency.  It turns out that it is indeed possible to explain the presence 
of authority in such a setting.  The key variables are 1) the urgency of decisions and, 
what is often the other side of the coin, the wish to avoid duplicative effort (Bolton 
and Farrell 1990), 2) decisive information (Casson 1994), 3) economies of scale in 
decision-making (Demsetz 1988; Hermalin 1998), and 4) the setting of incentives and 
the curbing of externalities (Holmström 1999).  These are discussed in the following. 
Urgency and Duplication Avoidance 
 While Hayek (1945) did much to identify the benefits of the price with respect 
to coping with the problems introduced by distributed knowledge and unexpected 
disturbances, he arguably neglected those situations where efficiency requires that 
adaptation be “coordinated” rather than “autonomous” (Williamson 1996).  
Coordinated adaptation or action may be required when actions or activities are 
complementary (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Kirsten Foss 2000). Coordination 
problems are examples of this.  In game-theoretic parlance, these problems obtain 
when there are more than one equilibrium in pure strategies.  Examples are 
Schelling’s famous where-to-meet problems (Schelling 1960) or the choice of 
standards, such as which side of the road to drive in.  Game theory demonstrates 
that even in extremely stylized and simple, but still decentralized, settings with 
players possessing perfect reasoning capabilities and common knowledge, they may 
still be unable to coordinate their independently taken actions or only coordinate 
these after costly trials and errors.  Authority may be a least-cost response to such 
problems (Foss 2001).   
 In order to isolate the costs and benefits of centralized and decentralized 
decision-making in a specific context, Bolton and Farrell (1990) study a coordination 
problem with private information in the setting of a natural monopoly market.  The 
coordination problem concerns who should enter the market when costs are sunk 
and are private information.  Under decentralization, which is represented as a two-
period incomplete information game of timing (sink costs/enter or wait another 
period), each firm is uncertain about whether the other firm will enter.  However, 
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the incentive to enter depends on the height of a given firm’s cost, low-cost firms 
being less worried that their rival will enter (and vice versa).  If costs are sufficiently 
dispersed, the optimal outcome prevails, that is, the lowest-cost producer enters and 
preempts the rival(s).  However, if costs are equal or are high for both, inefficiencies 
may obtain, since firms will then enter simultaneously (inefficient duplication) or 
will wait (inefficient delay).  
 Enter a central authority whose job is to nominate a firm for entry.  In the spirit 
of Hayek, Bolton and Farrell assume that this central authority cannot possess 
knowledge about costs.  In their model, s/he nominates the high cost producer half 
of the times, which is clearly inefficient.  However, this cost of centralization should 
be compared against the costs of decentralization (delay and duplication).  Bolton 
and Farrell show that “… the less important the private information that the planner 
lacks and the more essential coordination is, the more attractive the central planning 
solution is” (1990: 805).  Moreover, the decentralized solution performs poorly if 
urgency is important.  Centralization is assumed to not involve delay and therefore 
is a good mechanism for dealing with emergencies, a conclusion they argue is 
consistent with the observed tendencies of firms to rely on centralized authority in 
cases of emergencies.30 
 The inefficiencies under decentralization (duplication, delay) that Bolton and 
Farrell point to may arguably be particularly relevant for much “knowledge-
intensive” production.  This is because much of this production is “pooled” rather 
than “sequential” or “reciprocal” in the terminology of Thompson (1967), that is, 
involve relatively decentralized efforts aiming at a common end.  For example, 
research-based organizations where much production takes place in decentralized 
project-groups may be an example. A centralized authority may be necessary to 
give to priority to certain projects rather than other, even though that authority is 
basically very ill informed about the projects.31 
Decisive Information 
 Even under distributed knowledge, where the centralized decision-maker per 
definition does not possess (at least some) local information, s/he may in many 
cases still hold the information that is decisive.  Intuitively, information is decisive 
when actions taken on the basis of such knowledge impacts strongly on the firm’s 
payoffs.  According to Casson (1994), the extent to which a productive task 
involving the knowledge of several individuals has decisiveness features and the 
cost at which knowledge can be communicated helps to explain the allocation of 
decision rights.  For example, if supply conditions (changing technologies and/or 
input prices) are more volatile than demand conditions (changing sales and/or 
tastes), it may pay to investigate supply before investigating demand.  In fact, if 
                                                          
30  Although Bolton and Farrell don’t note this, the example is vulnerable to the critique that the 
two firms may enter a court-enforceable contract that let entry depend on the flipping of a coin.  
However, in many realistic situations, particularly when urgency is involved, contracts may not 
be court-enforceable or the potential delay introduced by using the court system may be 
intolerable.  
31  For a concrete example, namely the Danish hearing aids producer, Oticon, see Foss (2000).  
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supply volatility is considerably much higher, it may be evident what the firm 
should do in terms of its output and pricing decisions without checking demand 
conditions.  In both cases, information about supply is decisive (and more so in the 
latter case).   Note that decisiveness in the examples suggests that decision rights 
should be allocated towards to the production side of the firm.   The more general 
principle is that decision rights will tend to be concentrated in the hands of the 
individual who has access to the decisive information, and particularly so the more 
costly it is to communicate this information. 
 This means that there may be a role for authority under hidden knowledge, 
namely when the latter is not decisive, it is costly to communicate the knowledge 
that is decisive, and if the consequences of an incorrect decision are expected to be 
small relative to the costs of communicating the knowledge.  In contrast, extensive 
information-sharing is only necessary if each party holds information which is 
highly likely to be decisive or if the costs of not making the correct decision if 
lacking some of the tacit information are high.  In that case, knowledge transfer and 
delegation of decision rights are likely to characterize the organization. 
Economies of Scale 
 Demsetz (1988) argues that economies of scale in managing are a neglected 
factor in the explanation of the existence of firms and the understanding of 
authority, but doesn’t spell out the underlying reasoning. However, the relevant 
economies may relate both to managing the internal relations between agents inside 
the firm and managing relations to outside agents (customers, suppliers, 
government agencies) (Hermalin 1998).   Not only may there be scale economies in 
such activities; there may also be substantial learning economies.  Other agents may 
be happy to let a central agent incur the effort costs of negotiating, learning about 
potential suppliers, etc., and compensate him accordingly. At first glance, this only 
explains why a team may hire a “consultant”; it does not explain why this 
consultant should have any authority (Foss 1996).  However, as will be argued later, 
it may pay to give the consultant authority to the extent that he risks being held up 
by the other agents to whom he specializes his human capital. Giving the 
“consultant” authority is tantamount to giving him ownership to the firm’s 
alienable assets.  
Setting Incentives and Curbing Externalities 
 As pointed out earlier, Hayekian distributed knowledge poses special 
problems for the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive pay, as these as 
discussed in the mainstream agency literature (e.g., Holmström 1979) (Minkler 1993; 
Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss 1999; Foss and Foss 2000).  Minkler (1993: 23) argues 
that “… if the worker knows more than the entrepreneur, it is pointless for the 
entrepreneur to monitor the worker,” which implies that to the extent that 
monitoring is a precondition for the exercise of direction, using the authority 
mechanism also seems to become “pointless.”  In the extreme case, both the agent’s 
type and actions may be fully observable by the principal but the latter may still not 
understand the full set of production possibilities open to the agent (all in contrast 
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to the standard agency paradigm).  Clearly, in that extreme case, the problem is to 
design a contract that 1) allows the agent to use his superior knowledge ex post, and 
2) gives him the incentive to do so efficiently.  This will typically amount to 
allocating decision rights as well as rights to residual income streams to the agent, 
which indeed are key features of many new organizational forms.32 
 However, even under hidden knowledge, there may still be a role for 
authority. For example, Foss and Foss (2000) construct a hidden knowledge model 
in which the principal can, however, form conjectures of the payoffs that result from 
the agent’s activities (even though the principal cannot observe and fully 
understand these activities).  The payoffs are assumed to be related in a simple 
manner to the amount of discretion that is left to the agent.  It can then be shown 
that the surplus from the relation may be maximized by choosing degrees of 
discretion that differ from those the agent would have preferred if he were 
completely on his own.  The power to choose these levels of discretion (i.e., the exact 
delegation of decision rights) stems from the principal’s ownership of the assets in 
the relation.  
 More broadly, the ability of a principal to form conjectures with respect to an 
agent’s output even under hidden knowledge  what Knight (1921) called 
“judgment”  and enter into formal or informal contracts over this, imply that 
limited notions of monitoring and incentive pay may still have a role to play.  For 
example, so-called “forcing contracts,” in which, for example, a bonus is paid only if 
a certain threshold of output is reached may work under hidden knowledge. 
Subjective forms of performance assessment may be workable to the extent that the 
principal can form estimates of the level of output that can “reasonably” be 
expected of the agent.33  Even softer forms of incentive instruments  such as 
norms and the provision of intrinsic motivation  are arguably particularly 
important under hidden knowledge (see Jensen and Wruck 1994; Osterloh and Frey 
2000; Frost and Osterloh 2000). 
 In a somewhat speculative vein, it may be argued that the greater the 
departure from very simple settings where employees, undertaken routinized tasks, 
are very easily monitored and the harder we make it to find out what the employee 
can deliver and actually delivers, the more likely is it that an employer will choose 
to rely on multiple incentive instruments to influence employee behavior 
(Henderson 2000).  Under these circumstances, a key managerial task is to “balance” 
incentive instruments (Holmström 1999), that is, design and maintain coherence 
between the various ways in which an employee may be motivated so that negative 
                                                          
32  The problem and its solution are of course subtler than what this suggests.  The precise 
arrangements may also involve the payment of a lump sum from the agent to principal (as in 
franchising relationships), and it will be shaped by the risk-preferences of the parties and 
whether liquidity constraints are present or not. 
33  See Prendergast (1999) for an argument that higher environmental uncertainty may lead to 
more performanec pay (contrary to mainstream agency theory), because it complicates input 
monitoring.   
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spill-over effects between these ways are minimized.34 In a dynamic economy, 
maintaining coherence between such instruments may be a recurrent task.  
Economies of scale in this task may dictate that this activity is centralized.  
Moreover, centralization is required to the extent that externalities arise when the 
instruments are controlled by separate firms and transaction costs hinder the 
internalization of these externalities. Both arguments point towards the 
centralization of decision rights. 
Summing Up 
  It has been argued that it is possible to give efficiency explanations of 
authority in the sense of direction and centralized decision-making in the context of 
Hayekian settings.35 Thus, a response has been provided to Proposition 3 (“In the 
emerging knowledge economy, authority relations will become increasingly 
inefficient and insignificant means of allocating resources”).   This is not to say that 
authority relations, and the allocation of decision rights in firms in general, will be 
unaffected by the increased reliance on specialist knowledge (i.e., by Propositions 1 
and 2 becoming increasingly descriptively correct). The increasing prevalence of 
internal hybrids that go beyond traditional hierarchies (Zenger and Hesterly 1997) is 
very likely caused by the increased importance of Hayekian distributed knowledge. 
 Still, internal hybrids are organized inside the firm and are thus being subject 
to the exercise of authority. Thus, even if the hierarchy becomes flatter because of 
the existence of cellular organizations, authority persists.36  A reason for this is that 
even in knowledge-based firms, there may be a need for centralized coordination, as 
we have seen.  When there is such a need, it is often efficient to centralize ownership 
to alienable assets, as the following section demonstrates.  In turn, this suggests that 
centralized coordination is a feature of firms rather than markets.  In other words, it 
will be argued that the presence of Hayekian settings does not invalidate the notion 
of the boundaries of the firm, even when these are conceptualized in legal and 
ownership-based terms. 
VI. Ownership and Firm Boundaries in Hayekian Settings 
Ownership and Assets in the Knowledge Economy 
In the previous section, not say much about what backs up authority.  
However, we know from Hart (1995) and other economist of organization that 
ownership may play a key role in this respect; the purpose of the present section is 
                                                          
34  For example, if motivation is mainly secured by pecuniary means, this may harm other 
instruments, such as trying to motivate by fostering a culture that emphasizes trust and sharing. 
35  These reasons also seem broadly consistent with organization theory work on authority in the 
context of flat hierarchies (where Hayekian distributed knowledge is particularly to exist).  In a 
study of authority in newspaper publishing companies, Brass (1984) identified the determinants 
of authority as “criticality” (i.e., decisive knowledge), “centrality” (i.e., centralized decision 
rights because of economies of scale in certain tasks), and “the friendship network.” 
36  For a discussion of the differences between authority and hierarchy, see Ménard (1994).  
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to go more into ownership issues  particularly the ownership of knowledge assets 
 and therefore the issue of the boundaries of the firm.  One of the key 
characteristics of the knowledge economy is usually taken to be the increased 
importance in production of knowledge assets and the decreasing importance of 
physical assets  (Boisot 1998).  A further argument is that this transformation will 
also transform economic organization, because knowledge assets have different 
implications for the boundaries of firms than physical assets (e.g., Powell 1990; 
Zucker 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992; Boisot 1998; Mahnke 2001).37   
The category of “knowledge assets” is a broad one  encompassing 
individually held tacit knowledge, firm-level capabilities (“organizational 
knowledge”), patents, client lists, etc.  and difficult to analytically frame.38 
Perhaps for this reason, there are different  albeit all somewhat underdeveloped 
 modeling strategies available. One such strategy is to stress problems of 
appropriability as a key determinant of the boundaries of the firm (Teece 1987; 
Liebeskind 1997).  In this scheme, the boundaries of the firm reflect attempts to 
maximize the rent streams from the firm’s valuable knowledge assets (rather than 
the hold-up problem). A second one is to stress that many knowledge assets are 
collective or public goods (e.g., capabilities or reputational assets) and that this 
creates free-rider problems, causing a need to delimit access to such goods 
(Holmström and Roberts 1998; Frost and Osterloh 2000).  A third strategy is to argue 
that knowledge assets in the form of differential capabilities give rise to 
communication costs and attempts to economize with such costs help determining 
the boundaries of the firm (Langlois 1992; Monteverde 1995). A fourth possibility is 
to rely on more standard transaction cost economics and incomplete contracts 
theory arguments about the need to protect specialized assets and investments 
specific to such assets from rent-capture attempts (Rabin 1993; Brynjolfsson 1994; 
Putterman 1995).  Since the latter strategy is the one that most obviously connects to 
the theme of authority that has been pursued in so much of this paper, I briefly 
discuss this approach. 
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Knowledge Assets and the Boundaries of 
the Firm 
Following Brynjolfsson (1994), use will be made of the incomplete contracts 
modeling methodology of Hart and Moore (1990) to get an understanding of the 
implications of knowledge assets for the boundaries of the firm.  This is a key issue, 
because asset ownership may provide the bargaining lever that backs up authority, 
and the concentration of decision rights that we call authority may have important 
efficiency implications, as already argued.  Thus, this section connects the 
                                                          
37  In fact, two of the flagbearers of modern formal contract economics, Bengt Holmström and John 
Roberts (1998: 90), recently observed that “Information and knowledge are at the heart of 
organizational design, because they result in contractual and incentive problems that challenge 
both markets and firms … In light of this, it surprising that leading economic theories … have 
paid almost no attention to the role of organizational knowledge.” 
38  For example, it is not clear whether it makes sense to speak of ownership to firm-level 
capabilities.   For a discussion of this and related issues, see Zingales (2000).  
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discussion of authority in a knowledge economy with the issue of the boundaries of 
the firm in such an economy.  This emphasis is on supporting the claim made earlier 
that when there is a need for centralized coordination, efficiency considerations 
often suggest a need for also concentrating asset ownership (Holmström 1999; 
Hermalin 1999).  
The primary required change in the basic Hart and Moore framework is a 
more explicit introduction of knowledge assets (which may be alienable or non-
alienable).  In fact, we can dispense entirely with physical assets, and discuss a 
purely knowledge-based firm.39  It is assumed that agents enter into productive 
relations with other agents but that synergies between agents occur only through 
the assets that they control (and not through the actions they take).  Furthermore, 
although assets may influence the value of actions, the reverse is not true 
(Brynjolfsson 1994: 433).   This means that we can write the cost of agent i’s action as 
c (xi) and the marginal value of i’s actions when he is in a productive relation with 
other agents simply as vi (A), where A is the set of all assets owned by agents (and 
their actions can be suppressed).40    
For simplicity, assume that two agents interact and that one of these, “the 
entrepreneur,” owns a knowledge asset, K, that is “inside his head” (e.g., an 
entrepreneurial idea) and the other agent, “the scientist,” owns the only other asset 
in the relation, P, which we may assume to be a “patent.”  Both assets are necessary 
to the create value in the relation, and K and P are (strictly) complementary, so that 
the one is of value 0 without the other. It is prohibitively costly to communicate the 
knowledge embodied in K from the entrepreneur to the scientist, so K is effectively 
non-alienable, although the services of K may of course be traded.  Moreover, it is 
not possible to write a comprehensive contract, governing the use of the assets in all 
contingencies.  Given this, we may ask who should own the alienable asset, P, 
which  in terms of the Hart and Moore (1990) analysis    is tantamount to asking 
who should own the firm.    
In this setting, if the entrepreneur makes an effort investment, xe, that is, 
elaborates on his idea and creates extra value, the scientist can effect a hold-up on 
the entrepreneur, since the latter needs access to the patent to create value (and the 
contract is incomplete).  Of course, the reverse also holds, so that if the scientist 
makes an effort investment, xs, (e.g., makes a spin-off patent), the entrepreneur can 
hold-up the scientist by threathening to withdraw from the relation. Under the 
standard assumption of Nash bargaining, the entrepreneur and the scientist each 
realizes ½ of the extra value created as a result of their efforts.  Because of the 
externality problem, each underinvests; specifically, each party invests to the point 
                                                          
39  This is because the key issue is not whether assets are material or immaterial, but whether they 
are alienable or non-alienable.  
40  One may wonder what has happened to the notion of Hayekian distributed knowledge in this 
setting.  Although it is a necessary assumption that the agents can observe each others’ 
marginal product values, they don’t need to observe each others’ specific actions or know the 
underlying knowledge.  Thus, Hayekian distributed knowledge is consistent with the 
assumptions being made here.   
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where the marginal cost of effort investment equals ½ of the marginal value.41 
Suppose instead that the entrepreneur owns both the patent and the entrepreneurial 
idea.  This will strengthen the entrepreneur’s incentives (the scientist cannot hold 
him up anymore) and it will leave the scientist’s incentives unaffected.42  Obviously, 
this ownership arrangement should be chosen.43 
A conclusion at this stage is that it is possible to speak of the boundaries of the 
firm in terms of ownership (and therefore also in legal terms)  even in a situation 
where all assets are knowledge assets.44  However, this does not yet demonstrate the 
point made earlier, namely that concentration of coordination tasks produces a need 
for concentration of ownership.   We can address this issue, however, by assuming 
that one of the agents have decisive information (in the sense of Casson 1994).  
While efficiency may require that this agent should have decision rights amounting 
to authority, should he also be an owner?   
Consider a “knowledge-based” group of scientists where each scientist owns a 
patent, Pi.  One of the scientists possesses decisive knowledge, C, and the other 
scientists communicate directly with him rather than with each other.45 For 
example, this agent aggregates information from the messages of the other agents 
and issue directives.  His knowledge is decisive in the sense that without it, all 
actions of the other agents produce zero value.  The coordinator may improve on 
this decisive knowledge.  Each agent needs access to his own patent and to C in 
order to be productive.  Given this assumption (which means that we need only 
consider relations between any agent and the coordinator), we have the by now 
familiar under-investment problem for both the coordinator and the scientists.46  If 
the coordinator is given ownership to all patents, things change: While the 
incentives of the scientists are not affected,47 the incentives of the coordinator to 
invest in augmenting his decisive coordination knowledge are strengthened.  Thus, 
this ownership arrangement should be chosen.  
                                                          
41  The first-order conditions are given by 1) ½ve (K, P) + ½ ve (K) = c’ (xe) and 2) ½ vs (K, P) + ½ vs 
(P) = c’ (xs).   Since it has been assumed that the value of the assets outside the relation is zero, 
the second term in 1) and 2) equals zero. 
42  This may be seen from inspecting the first order conditions when the entrepreneur owns both K 
and P:  3) ½ ve (K, P) + ½ ve (K, P) = c’ (xe) and 4) ½vs (K, P) = c’ (xs). 
43  This shows somewhat more formally the argument made earlier that incentives are likely to be 
strengthened by spinning off employees who come up with idiosyncratic entrepreneurial ideas 
that are costly to communicate to the rest of the firm.  
44  For applications of the basic model, for example, with respect to what happens if knowledge (K) 
is made alienable, see Brynjolfsson (1994).   
45  Clearly, this is a strong assumption, but one that is made for analytical convenience.  The main 
point simply is that there is a central agent whose centrality in the information network is 
crucial to the value-creating efforts of other agents.  
46  For example, the first-order condition for any individual scientist is:  5) ½ vi (P, C) + ½ vi (P) = c’ 
(xi), where the second term is zero. 
47  The first-order condition for any individual scientist is now:   6) ½vi (P, C) = c’ (xi), which is the 
same as 5). 
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Summing Up 
 Although the framework that has been applied in this section is extremely 
stylized and in many ways quite limited (Holmström 1999; Foss and Foss 2001), it 
does succeed in providing an answer to Proposition 4 in Section II that “[t]he 
boundaries of firms blur because of the increasing importance of knowledge 
networks that transcend those boundaries.  Thus, while legal and ownership-based 
definitions of the boundaries of the firm may formally be made, they will be 
increasingly irrelevant from an economic (and strategic) perspective.” The analysis 
shows, first, that it makes perfect sense to address ownership issues in terms of 
knowledge assets, and, second, that ownership to such assets may be important in 
situations where agents need to be provided with incentives (and where contracts 
are incomplete).  Therefore, ownership-based (and therefore also legal) definitions 
of the boundaries of the firm will continue to be crucially important.  The discussion 
ties together the notions of authority and ownership in the context of knowledge-
based production.  As will be argued in the following section, this has implications 
for the malleability of coordination mechanisms, for example, the extent to which 
market mechanisms can be introduced in firms.    
VII. Coordination Mechanisms in Hayekian Settings  
The Malleability and Combinability of Coordination Mechanisms 
 The dominant perspective in much of organization theory and organizational 
economics has been that there are stable, discrete governance structures that 
combine various coordination mechanisms in predictable ways.  The specific 
combinations are typically seen as being dependent upon the underlying 
technology, characteristics of the environment, such as exchange conditions, and the 
strategy of the firm (Thompson 1967; Williamson 1985, 1996; Holmström and 
Milgrom 1994; Nickerson and Zenger 2000).   
 In contrast to this, it has been argued that there are no compelling reasons why 
specific coordination mechanisms should necessarily cluster in a few ideal typical 
governance structures of the “firm-hybrid-market” variety (particularly Grandori 
1997, 2000).  In particular, advances in networked computing, management 
information systems, and methods of measuring performance have made possible a 
richer set of combinations of coordination mechanisms.  “Cellular” or “molecular” 
forms are examples.  The fact that these forms  which much operate on market-
like principles  are still organized inside firms serve to illustrate the flexibility 
with which coordination mechanisms may be combined.  This raises the issue of 
whether there are constraints on the ways in which coordination mechanisms may 
be combined.  
 There is a substantial literature on these points.  For example, in economics, 
much emphasis has been placed on the need to design organizational structures so 
that their constituent elements are complementary (Holmström and Milgrom 1994; 
Zenger 1997; Zenger and Hesterly 1997).  Organization theory has long highlighted 
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“consistency” among constituent elements (Burns and Stalker 1961; Thompson 
1967).   The following section argues that authority is an element of the consistency 
of elements of an organizational firm, using internal hybrids as an example. 
 
Incentive Limits to the Use of Market Mechanisms 
The problem of combining market and hierarchy has been much discussed in 
economics.  Notably, the Austrian economics Ludwig von Mises (1949: 709)  argued 
that there are inherent contradictions involved in ”playing market,” that is, trying to 
simulate a market in the context of hierarchy. With reference to various socialist 
schemes of his day that tried to preserve some market relations while eliminating 
capital and financial markets, Mises argued that these schemes would be 
unworkable.  The concentration of ultimate decision-making rights and 
responsibilities, and therefore ownership, in the hands of a central planning board 
would dilute the incentives of managers.  Thus, while planning authorities could 
delegate rights to make production and investment decisions to managers, these 
rights were likely to be used inefficiently.  First, since managers couldn’t be sure 
that they would not be overruled by the planning authorities, they were not likely to 
take a long view, notably in their investment decisions.  Moreover, since managers 
were not the ultimate owners, they were not the full residual claimants of their 
decisions and, hence, would not make efficient decisions.  Therefore, Mises 
declared, the attempt to ”play market” under socialism would lead to inefficiencies.   
In a related vein, the attempt to simulate markets in a firm hierarchy may lead to 
inefficiencies.   
 As later research has clarified, the problem may be handled if the planning 
authorities can credibly commit to a non-interference policy.  However, doing so 
may be very hard, since reneging on a promise to delegate will in many cases be 
extremely tempting and those to whom rights are delegated anticipate this.48  
 The logic may be stated in the following way (cf. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 
1999).  Assume that a subordinate initiates a project.49  Assume further that the 
manager has information that is necessary to perform an assessment of the project, 
but that he decides upfront to ratify any project that the subordinate proposes.  
Effectively, this amounts to full informal delegation of the rights to initiate and 
ratify projects   ”informal,” because the formal right to ratify is still in the hands of 
the manager and because that right cannot be allocated to the subordinate through a 
court-enforceable contract (cf. Williamson 1996).   Because the subordinate values 
being given freedom, this will induce more effort in searching for new projects 
(Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss and Foss 2000).  The expected benefits of these 
                                                          
48  Transaction cost economist, Oliver Williamson (1996) has referred to these kinds of problems 
with his concept of the ”impossibility of (efficient) selective intervention.” The main problem is 
that incentives are diluted.   This is because the option to intervene ”… can be exercised both for 
good cause (to support expected net gains) and for bad (to support the subgoals of the 
intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151).  Promises to only intervene for good cause can never 
be credible, Williamson argues, because they are unenforcable. 
49   This should be understood in a broad sense: A “project” may refer to many different types of 
decisions or clusters of decisions. 
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increased efforts may overwhelm the expected costs from bad projects that the 
manager has to ratify.  However, the problem is that because the manager has 
information about the state of a project (”bad” or ”good”), he may be tempted to 
renege on a promise to delegate decision authority, that is, intervene in a “selective” 
manner.  But if he overrules the subordinate, the latter will lose trust in him, holding 
back on effort.  Clearly, in this game a number of equilibria are feasible.  The 
particular equilibrium that emerges will be determined by the discount rate of the 
manager, the specific trigger strategy followed by the sub-ordinate (e.g., will he lose 
trust in the manager for all future periods if he is overruled?), and how much the 
manager values his reputation for not reneging relative to the benefits of reneging 
on a bad project (for details and extensions, see Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999). 
 Arguably, organizations that try to infuse their structures with organizational 
elements characteristic of the market are more prone to suffer from these 
commitment problems than firms with more traditional hierarchical structures.  The 
reasons are that decision rights are more solidly established in a traditional 
hierarchy than in, say, a flat, project-based organization, and that a CEO who 
selectively intervenes in a hierarchical organization risk overruling the whole 
managerial hierarchy, whereas this is not a concern in a flat organization. 
Implications 
  An implication is that mixing very different coordination mechanisms may 
lead to efficiency losses, and may not be sustainable for this reason.50 The basic 
problem is that emulating market organization inside firms amounts to ”playing 
market.” Unlike independent agents in markets, corporate employees never possess 
ultimate decision rights.  They are not full owners.  This means that those who 
possess ultimate decision rights can always overrule employees.  Thus, there are 
fundamental incentive limits to the extent to which market principles can be applied 
inside firms.   
  These insights imply that coordination mechanisms are not combinable in an 
arbitrary fashion.   In other words, using the case of internal hybrids, an argument 
has been made that Proposition 5 (i.e., “[c]oordination mechanisms will be 
combined in new, innovative ways, suggesting that these mechanisms are 
inherently combinable and not limited to being necessarily clustered in certain 
discrete governance structures”) needs substantial qualification.  There are inherent 
(incentive) limits to the extent to which such mechanisms can be combined.  It is the 
inherent tension between authority (backed up by ownership) and delegated rights 
that creates limits to the combinability of coordination mechanims.  To the extent 
that authority persists in the knowledge economy, so will these limits.  
VIII. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
50  Foss (2000) for a specific empirical application, namely the application of market principles in 
the internal organization of the Danish hearing aid producer, Oticon.   
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Addressing economic organization in the context of the emerging knowledge 
economy is a task of almost forbidding complexity.  It is also inherently speculative, 
suggesting that the use of scenario techniques may be appropriate (Hodgson 1998a) 
and that a multi-disciplinary approach may be justified (Daft and Lewin 1993).  
However, the present paper has taken a more narrow approach, being founded on 
the conviction that organizational economics is helpful for clarifying the central 
issues and providing tentative answers, and has tried to demonstrate this.  
Admittedly, the richness of the recent literature on organization in the knowledge 
economy may have been sacrificed by the relative narrowness of the present 
approach.  On the other hand, the approach of this paper has been to try to distill 
some key assumptions and propositions that characterize much of this literature, 
and examine these in the light of organizational economics.  This has the advantage 
of making explicit what may be the issues of contention and the terms of the debate.  
Needless to say, although a strong attempt has of course been made to be fair to the 
literature, the danger of having constructed a strawman is present; but at least the 
possibility of ascertaining whether this is the case exists.   
 Thus, it has been argued that for the purposes of examining crucial 
phenomena of economic organization  relating to authority, the boundaries of 
firms and organizational design  the recent literature on economic organization in 
the knowledge economy may be summarized in a handy way by means of six basic 
assumptions.  Of these, the two first were statements about the use of knowledge in 
production.  These were flatly accepted, and used as “inputs” (i.e., assumptions) for 
subsequent analysis of the remaining four propositions.  Thus, it was essentially 
asked: Accepting that knowledge has become increasingly distributed and that 
knowledge assets are increasingly important in production, is it then true that 
authority relations will wither, that legal and ownership-based definitions of the 
boundaries will become unimportant, and that coordination mechanisms can be 
combined virtually at will?  
 The answers to all these questions were negative. This is where the strawman 
issue enters the discussion.  Although it may be possible to find authors who 
present propositions 1) to 6) in an extreme form, it may also be argued that one can 
always dig up unimportant extremists, smash their arguments, and obtain an easy 
victory.   Two responses are pertinent here.  First, the proponents of Propositions 3 
to 6 that have been cited are not unimportant extremists, but established and 
respected academics.  Second, even if the statements contained in Propositions 3 to 6 
were the brainchildren of intellectual extremists, investigating them would still have 
been a worthwhile task.  This is because such an activity helps establishing the 
boundaries of the discussion.   For example, although it may be argued that nobody 
truly believes that all authority relations will disappear completely in the 
knowledge economy, we still need to know why authority relations will persist and 
how they will change.  Answering this question makes us better understand the 
limits and potentials of authority in Hayekian settings.  For example, as I have 
argued, it furthers understanding of the extent to which coordination mechanisms 
that are characteristic of market allocation can be introduced in firms’ internal 
organization.   Although the discussion in this paper moves on an abstract level,  
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managerial implications may thus be derived from it.
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”Hayekian
settings”
• Distributed
knowledge.
• Knowledge
assets crucial for
value creation.
Economic organization
in Hayekian settings
• Authority has a very
small role to play.
• Ownership-based and
legal notions of firm
boundaries econo-
mically irrelevant.
• Coordination
mechanisms malleable.
(Props 3-5)
Prop. 6
(Props 1,2)
Figure 1
Economic Organization in Hayekian settings
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Figure 2
Authority in economics
An employ-
ment contract
is struck
State of
nature
realized
Boss observes
state and directs
worker.
Worker carries
out instruction
and receives
wage.
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